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THE MIXED UP EXERCISE OF ADMIRALTY 
JURISDICTION OVER MIXED CONTRACTS, 
NAMELY UMBRELLA INSURANCE POLICIES 
COVERING SHORE-SIDE AND SEA-SIDE RISKS 
Philip Michael Powell Esq.∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Given the broad-ranging implications associated with having a 
dispute decided by a federal court pursuant to the court’s admiralty 
jurisdiction, potential parties to a dispute have strong motivations to 
either avoid a court sitting in admiralty or ensure the court hears the 
controversy under the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction. 
Prior to 2004, the legal test used by courts to determine whether or 
not they could hear a contractual dispute involving a contract with both 
maritime and non-maritime elements (“mixed contract”) pursuant to their 
admiralty jurisdiction was relatively straight forward. Under that test, a 
court could exercise admiralty jurisdiction to hear a mixed contractual 
dispute where the non-maritime portion of the contract was (1) merely 
incidental to the overall contract or (2) the non-maritime portion of the 
contract could be separated from the maritime portion of the contract.1 
According to the above test, where the maritime and non-maritime 
claims were bound together and could not be separated, the court would 
dismiss the entire case, even the maritime portion of the contract, for a 
lack of admiralty jurisdiction.2 This test was relatively straight forward 
and fairly easy to apply to contractual disputes. However, in 2004, the 
U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in Norfolk Southern 
Railway Co. v. Kirby, whereby the jurisdictional test was fundamentally 
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 1. Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba v. Snobl, 363 F.2d 733, 735-36 (4th Cir. 1965). 
 2. THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 3-10 (4th ed. 2004); 
see also Brocsonic Co. v. M/V Mathilde Maersk, 270 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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changed.3 The rule asserted by the Court in Kirby focused on the 
maritime portions of the mixed contract and, according to this new test, a 
court could decide a contractual dispute involving a mixed contract under 
the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction where the maritime portions of 
the contract were substantial, even when the dispute centered on non-
maritime elements of the contract.4 Whereas the Court’s jurisdictional 
approach to mixed contracts as asserted in Kirby may have made sense 
with regard to contracts for multi-modal transportation, the application of 
the test by Circuit Courts has provided anything but uniformity or 
predictability with regard to other types of mixed contracts.   
This lack of uniformity or predictability in the application of the 
general maritime law through the exercise of courts’ admiralty 
jurisdiction is not a desirable outcome, especially as a predominant goal 
of admiralty practice in American courts has always been uniformity. 
This judicial emphasis on uniformity is best explained in the Supreme 
Court’s decision in The Lottawanna where the Court specifically stated: 
One thing, however, is unquestionable; the Constitution must 
have referred to a system of law coextensive with, and operating 
uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could not have been 
the intention to place the rules and limits of maritime law under 
the disposal and regulation of the several States, as that would 
have defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the 
Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character 
affecting the intercourse of the States with each other or with 
foreign states.5 
Given this disparity in the several Circuit Courts’ application of the 
Kirby test for mixed contracts, and the broad goal of admiralty 
jurisdiction to provide uniformity in its application of the general 
maritime law,6 the application of the Kirby test should be limited to 
multi-modal transportation contracts. With regard to other types of mixed 
contracts, the courts should take a different approach, specifically 
tailored to determine the substantiality of the maritime elements of that 
particular type of contract. The above approach would better facilitate 
the uniformity and predictability of maritime practice that courts have 
aspired to maintain since the beginning of the federal system of 
government in the United States. 
                                                     
 3. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14 (2004).  
 4. Id. at 27. 
 5. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 575 (1874). 
 6. Id. 
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As such, this Article examines the three main types of contracts 
confronted by the courts in their application of the rule asserted in Kirby. 
These three main types of contracts include: (1) multi-modal 
transportation contracts exemplified by “through-bills of lading” (and 
other contracts with objective geographic elements); (2) master service 
agreements or blanket contracts common in the offshore oil rig context; 
and (3) umbrella or bumbershoot insurance policies that provide 
coverage for both shore-side and maritime risks. While master service 
agreements and multi-modal transportation contracts will be discussed 
herein, much of the jurisdictional confusion has been centered on mixed 
coverage insurance policies; therefore, this Article will focus on that 
issue area.  
In examining the application of the modern jurisdictional test for the 
aforementioned mixed contract types, this Article will begin by 
investigating the basis for the courts’ admiralty jurisdiction, looking at 
the historical, constitutional, statutory, and precedential origin of modern 
jurisprudence over admiralty jurisdiction. Through this prism, this 
Article will discuss the impact the Supreme Court’s decision in Kirby 
had on the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction over mixed contracts. By 
looking at the various Circuit Courts’ applications of the Kirby test, this 
Article seeks to illustrate the confusion the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Kirby has caused. Based on this examination, this Article asserts that 
courts have done an altogether inadequate job of formulating a uniform, 
cohesive, and predictable rule or set of rules with which to determine 
which marine insurance contracts—that provide both sea-side and shore-
side risk coverage—are sufficiently “salty”7 to justify the exercise of 
admiralty jurisdiction for resolving controversies arising from such 
policies.   
Additionally, this Article argues that given the magnitude of the 
implications associated with the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction in 
resolution of contractual disputes, such as the use of general maritime 
law or the availability of admiralty-specific procedural devices, the 
Supreme Court has done the maritime industry a great disservice in its 
failure to formulate an understandable and applicable set of jurisdictional 
rules. As such, commercial interests would be better served by a 
coherent, uniform, and predictable rule or set of rules so as to more 
effectively negotiate and draft contracts and resolve disputes derived 
therefrom. Given this reality, the Kirby rule should be limited in its 
application to multi-modal transportation contracts and other contracts 
involving an element of geographic movement or insurance coverage 
                                                     
 7. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742 (1961). 
4 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:1 
 
thereof and master service agreements, as applied in Grand Isle 
Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC.8 But with regard to mixed 
insurance policies, the Supreme Court should follow the Second Circuit’s 
approach as discussed herein.9    
II. HISTORICAL, CONSTITUTIONAL, AND STATUTORY BASIS FOR 
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION 
The roots of American jurisprudence on admiralty jurisdiction and 
substantive maritime law were inherited from English law.10 Whereas 
prior to American independence, many maritime disputes were decided 
by Vice Admiralty Courts, after the revolution and under the Articles of 
Confederation, there was no national judiciary and each state exercised 
sovereign powers, setting up state courts, including admiralty courts, and 
individual laws that created a very disjointed system in terms of maritime 
law.11 As such, given the above experience and the fact that the legal 
issues and implications associated with maritime commerce and industry 
necessarily involved, and still involve, international relations, foreign 
trade, interstate commerce and trade, and potentially the rights of foreign 
citizens, uniformity of maritime law was then, and has remained, a goal 
of the judiciary.12 This judicial interest in uniformity of maritime law, 
based on the national interests involved, was as relevant during the time 
of the Founders as it is today, and in order to better facilitate uniformity, 
the Founders believed the Federal Judiciary, rather than those of the 
several states, was the best body to adjudicate maritime issues.13 
Alexander Hamilton went so far as to say,  
[t]he most bigoted idolizers of State authority have not thus far 
shown a disposition to deny the national judiciary the 
cognizances of maritime causes. These so generally depend on 
the laws of nations, and so commonly affect the rights of 
foreigners, that they fall within the considerations which are 
relative to the public peace.14  
                                                     
 8. 589 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 9. See infra Section III(C)(2)(c). 
 10. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 2, § 1-6. 
 11. Id. 
 12. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917) (citing The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 
558, 575 (1874). 
 13. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 14. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. 
Press 2009).  
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Based on the above, it was clear from the outset of the judiciary and 
the United States that the need for federal judicial authority to occupy the 
field with regard to maritime law for the sake of uniformity outweighed 
the interests of the individual states.  
In response to the above experience, the drafters of the U.S. 
Constitution enumerated that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend . . .  to all 
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.”15 Because Article III of 
the Constitution only defined the judicial authority of the Supreme Court, 
Congress was forced to use its Constitutional authority “[t]o constitute 
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court,”16 and further confer admiralty 
jurisdiction to those inferior courts, which it first did in the Judiciary Act 
of 1789.17 Substantively, the verbiage of the Judiciary Act of 1789 has 
remained unchanged and is now codified.18 The original wording of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 held that: 
the district courts shall have, exclusively of the courts of the 
several States . . . exclusive original cognizance of all civil 
causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including all 
seizures under laws of impost, navigation or trade of the United 
States, where the seizures are made, on waters which are 
navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burthen, 
within their respective districts as well as upon the high seas; 
saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, 
where the common law is competent to give it. . . .19 
Much like that of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the wording of the modern 
incantation of the above statute holds that: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of 
the courts of the States, of: 
(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, 
saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they 
are otherwise entitled. 
(2) Any prize brought into the United States and all 
proceedings for the condemnation of property taken as 
prize.20 
                                                     
 15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
 17. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, ch. 20, § 9. 
 18. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012).   
 19. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, ch. 20, § 9. 
 20. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012). 
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Given the political and legislative history of the current grant of subject 
matter jurisdiction, it is plain that the intent of the above was to ensure 
that federal courts have jurisdiction over disputes concerning maritime 
matters in order to ensure uniformity.21 It is based on the above 
historical, constitutional, and statutory basis that federal district and 
appellate courts are legally able to exercise jurisdiction over “all Cases of 
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.”22 
III. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION 
As is alluded to above, Article Three of the United States 
Constitution created the Federal Judiciary by vesting “[t]he judicial 
Power of the United States . . .  in one supreme Court, and in such 
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.”23 In addition to the Constitutional creation of the Supreme 
Court and grant of power given to Congress to establish inferior 
tribunals,24 the Constitution also provided the legal basis for the federal 
courts’ exercise of jurisdiction. In doing so, the U.S. Constitution holds 
that the judicial authority of Federal courts: 
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, 
or which shall be made, under their Authority; to all Cases 
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; to 
all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to 
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to 
Controversies between two or more States; between a State and 
Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States; 
between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants 
of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, 
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”25 
In addition to the above grant of subject matter jurisdiction, the U.S. 
Constitution also specifies that with regard to the original and appellate 
jurisdictions of the Supreme Court:  
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the Supreme 
                                                     
 21. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 575 (1874). 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1. 
 24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
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Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases 
before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate 
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and 
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.26 
Based on this Constitutional framework, and the Congressional power to 
“constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court,”27 there are 
historically and currently three bases for federal subject matter 
jurisdiction. These include: 1) federal question jurisdiction,28  2) diversity 
jurisdiction,29 and 3) admiralty jurisdiction.30   
The designation of jurisdictional basis, under which a federal court 
may hear a claim, is significant because it affects the choice of law in 
deciding the suit and the availability of certain procedural rules in 
litigating the controversy. Accordingly, where a claim is based on “the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” a federal court has 
original jurisdiction to hear the claim based on its federal question 
jurisdiction and will decide the claim applying the law in controversy.31 
Alternatively, where a claim involves litigants of diverse citizenship and 
an amount in controversy that exceeds $75,000, a court may hear the 
case pursuant to its diversity jurisdiction.32 Unlike the courts’ choice of 
law in a federal question claim, when the court hears a case pursuant to 
its diversity jurisdiction, the court will apply the substantive state law of 
the forum in determining the rights and remedies of the parties.33 Finally, 
where a dispute is heard by a court sitting in admiralty, pursuant to its 
admiralty jurisdiction, the parties have available to them, or are subject 
to, substantive maritime law and procedural rules of admiralty that are 
unique to admiralty and maritime law and give rise to significant legal 
implications.34  
Because the exercise of a court’s admiralty jurisdiction to hear 
maritime cases is accompanied by significant legal implications, parties 
have strong motivations to either avoid federal courts sitting in admiralty 
or ensure the court hears the dispute while sitting in admiralty.  Some of 
the aforementioned legal implications include: 1) the availability of 
                                                     
 26. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
 28. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). 
 29. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). 
 30. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012). 
 31. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). 
 32. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). 
 33. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 34. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012). 
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“Federal Admiralty Common Law,”35 exemplified by a lack of a Statute 
of Frauds;36 2) a significant amount of judge-made substantive maritime 
law due to a lack of Congressional legislation in the area of maritime 
law;37 3) the availability of theoretically less biased life-tenured judges;38 
4) the availability of a bench trial before a sophisticated judge with 
expertise in admiralty and maritime law rather than a jury;39 5) the 
availability of maritime liens40 and the corresponding ability to bring a 
suit In Rem;41 6) the ability to bring a suit Quasi In Rem and attach 
unrelated property of the defendant;42 7) presumptive validity and 
enforceability of contractual choice of law clauses;43 8) the availability of 
the principle of general average to disperse damages among parties to a 
common adventure;44 and 9) the general maritime law doctrine of 
laches.45 Based on the aforementioned legal implications arising of the 
courts’ exercise of their admiralty jurisdiction and the accompanying 
application of substantive and procedural rules particular to maritime 
law, uniform, cohesive, and predictable jurisdictional rules should be a 
desired result of any court seeking to fashion tests for whether the 
exercise of admiralty jurisdiction is appropriate.  
IV. JUDICIAL RULES ASSOCIATED WITH ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION 
While the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes have provided the 
legal basis and framework for the Federal Judiciary’s exercise of 
admiralty jurisdiction over matters of admiralty and maritime law, the 
vast majority of jurisdictional rules are judge made. With regard to 
                                                     
 35. GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY (2d ed. 
2001). 
 36. Selame Assocs., Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 412 (D. Mass. 1978); 
Keller v. U.S., 557 F. Supp. 1218 (D.N.H. 1983); Vieira v. Maher Terminals, Inc., 1998 
WL 1085912 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 37. Robert J. Gruendel & Angelique M. Crain, The Maritime Contract and Admiralty 
Jurisdiction: Recent Developments Help Clarify an Inherently Confused Landscape, 77 
TUL. L. REV. 1235, 1238 (2003). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 2, § 9-1. 
 41. FED. R. CIV. P. C. 
 42. FED. R. CIV. P. B. 
 43.  St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Port of New Orleans, 418 
F. App’x 305, 309 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) PLC v. Durham 
Auctions, Inc., 585 F.3d 236, 242 (5th Cir. 2009)). 
 44. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 2, § 17-2. 
 45. Id. § 5-23. 
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admiralty jurisdiction, the rules the Supreme Court has created to decide 
whether it has jurisdiction to decide on a case depends on the basis of the 
claim. The judicially-created jurisdictional test the Court applies to 
determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction under its admiralty 
jurisdiction depends on whether the cause of action arises out of a tort 
claim or a contractual dispute. 
A. Admiralty Jurisdiction: Tort 
Because much of the American admiralty common law has its roots 
in English admiralty law,46 certain vestiges of that heritage remain in 
modern American admiralty jurisprudence.  However, for various 
reasons, there are several departures from English law. Notably 
American courts have relied less on the English courts’ emphasis on 
location in testing whether said courts may exercise admiralty 
jurisdiction. Unlike English courts, which base their jurisdiction over tort 
purely on location, such that the English court will only exercise 
admiralty jurisdiction over a controversy where the tort takes place 
within the “ebb and flow” of the tide,47 American courts have adhered to 
a location- and nexus-based test. 
As such, where the cause of action is based on tort, the court will use 
a two prong location and nexus test developed in trilogy of cases: 
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland,48 Foremost Insurance 
Co. v. Richardson,49 and Sisson v. Ruby.50 This test was later definitively 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great 
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.51 In Grubart, the Court focused on the 
location of the tortious conduct that gave rise to the injury to determine 
whether it was able to exercise admiralty jurisdiction over a tort claim.52 
In doing so the Court held that the locational aspect of the two-part 
jurisdictional test was satisfied where “the tort occurred on navigable 
water or . . .  [the] injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on 
navigable water.”53 The Court went on to hold that the nexus portion of 
the jurisdictional test for the court’s exercise of admiralty jurisdiction to 
decide a tort claim was satisfied where, given the “general features of the 
                                                     
 46. Id. § 1-6.   
 47. Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443, 457-58 (1851). 
 48. 409 U.S. 249 (1972). 
 49. 457 U.S. 668 (1982). 
 50. 497 U.S. 358 (1990). 
 51. 513 U.S. 527 (1995). 
 52. Id. at 534. 
 53. Id. 
10 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:1 
 
type of incident involved,”54 the incident has “a potentially disruptive 
impact on maritime commerce” and the “general character” of the 
“activity giving rise to the incident” shows a “substantial relationship to 
traditional maritime activity.”55 
B. Admiralty Jurisdiction: Contract 
Like the American jurisdictional test for tort, the American 
jurisdictional test for contracts also differs from that of English 
jurisprudence. According to the old test propagated by English law, a 
court sitting in admiralty may only exercise jurisdiction to decide a 
dispute when the contract was “made upon the sea and to be executed 
thereon.”56 Unlike the English jurisdictional test for torts and contracts, 
and the American jurisdictional test for tort, both of which focus on 
locale in determining whether or not a court may exercise its admiralty 
jurisdiction to hear a claim, American courts use a more conceptual 
approach with regard to the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction over 
contractual disputes.57 For this reason, when the cause of action arises 
out of a contractual dispute, the court focuses on the nature and subject 
matter of a contract, rather than the location of where the contract was 
created or to be performed, to determine if the court may exercise its 
admiralty jurisdiction in order to decide a maritime contractual dispute.58   
This marks a vast departure for American jurisprudence from its 
English heritage. The American tradition of focusing on the subject 
matter and nature of the contact rather than the location of the contract or 
the dispute had its roots in Delovio v. Boit,59 where Justice Joseph Story 
pronounced:  
[t]he delegation of cognizance of “all civil cases of admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction” to the courts of the United States 
comprehends all maritime contracts, torts, and injuries. The latter 
branch is necessarily bounded by locality; the former extends 
over all contracts, (wheresoever they may be made or executed, 
or whatsoever may be the form of the stipulations,) which relate 
to the navigation, business or commerce of the sea.60  
                                                     
 54. Id. (citing Sisson, 497 U.S. at 363). 
 55. Id. 
 56. New Eng. Mut. Marine Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. 1, 26 (1870). 
 57. See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 735 (1961). 
 58. DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 444 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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This position was further entrenched as American jurisprudence in the 
Supreme Court’s watershed case New England Mutual Marine Ins. Co. v. 
Dunham.61 In New England Mutual Marine Ins. Co., the Court was asked 
to decide whether a marine insurance contract was one falling under the 
Court’s admiralty jurisdiction. In so deciding, Justice Joseph P. Bradley 
wrote:  
[a]s to contracts, it has been equally well settled that the English 
rule which concedes jurisdiction, with a few exceptions, only to 
contracts made upon the sea and to be executed thereon (making 
locality the test) is entirely inadmissible, and that the true 
criterion is the nature and subject-matter of the contract, as 
whether it was a maritime contract, having reference to maritime 
service or maritime transactions.62 
The Court expanded on this notion in Kossick v. United Fruit Co.63 by 
pronouncing that in determining whether a contract was a maritime 
contract or not, “[t]he only question is whether the transaction relates to 
ships and vessels, masters and mariners, as the agents of commerce.”64  It 
was from these jurisdictional decrees that the modern rule was derived, 
holding that the court may exercise admiralty jurisdiction over a contract 
so long as it was a maritime contract, such that the subject matter of the 
contract must be “relating to a ship in its use as such, or to commerce or 
navigation on navigable waters, or to transportation by sea or to maritime 
employment.”65  
However, because this jurisdictional test is conceptually amorphous 
and overly academic in nature, courts have had to resort to a case-by-
case-based inquiry to determine which contracts were “salty”66 enough to 
be classified as maritime contracts deserving of admiralty jurisdiction. In 
so doing, the courts look at the subject matter of the contract, but they are 
also heavily dependent upon judicial precedent in determining the 
“contours of admiralty contract jurisdiction.”67   
                                                     
 61. New Eng. Mut. Marine Ins. Co., 78 U.S. at 20. 
 62. Id. 
 63. 365 U.S. 731 (1961). 
 64. Id. at 736. 
 65. J.A.R., Inc. v. M/V Lady Lucille, 963 F.2d 96, 98 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting 
Thurmond v. Delta Well Surveyors, 836 F.2d 952, 954 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting 1 E. 
JHIRAD, A. SANN, B. CHASE & M. CHYNSKY, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 183, at 11-6 (7th 
ed. 1985)). 
 66. See Kossick, 365 U.S. at 742. 
 67. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 2, § 3-10; see also Exxon Corp. v. Cent. Gulf Lines, 
Inc., 500 U.S. 603 (1991).  
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Given the above, courts have determined that the following contracts 
have a “genuinely salty flavor”68 justifying the exercise of admiralty 
jurisdiction over the disputes arising therefrom: 1) marine insurance 
contracts;69 2) contracts for the carriage of goods or affreightment;70  3) 
charter party agreements;71 4) service contracts for cargo or vessels 
(including stevedoring services);72  5) container lease agreements;73  6) 
contracts for vessel repair and conversion;74  7) shipboard employment 
contracts;75 and  8) towage and salvage contracts.76 Conversely, the 
courts have declined to exercise admiralty jurisdiction over the following 
contracts due to their lack of the requisite “saltiness”77: 1) contracts for 
the building and sale of a vessel;78 2) certain agency contracts;79 3) 
contracts for the storage of cargo;80 and 4) certain preliminary contracts 
(i.e., bond securing performance of a charter party81 and marine 
insurance brokerage contract). 82 
Based on the modern jurisdictional rule and the plethora of 
precedential law, courts have provided an adequately uniform approach 
to the exercise of their admiralty jurisdiction in resolving contractual 
disputes. This uniformity has provided parties to both maritime and non-
maritime contracts a desirable level of foreseeability and predictability 
with respect to which law will apply and what procedural and legal 
effects they will encounter in the event that a dispute arises out of the 
contract. With regard to mixed contracts, those contracts containing both 
                                                     
 68. See Kossick, 365 U.S. at 742. 
 69. New Eng. Mut. Marine Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. 1, 1 (1870). 
 70. Ex parte Easton, 95 U.S. 68, 72 (1877). 
 71. Kirno Hill Corp. v. Holt, 618 F.2d 982, 984 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 72. Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355 (1962). 
 73. CTI-Container Leasing Corp. v. Oceanic Operations Corp., 682 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 
1982). 
 74. N. Pac. S.S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Marine Ry. & Shipbuilding Co., 249 U.S. 119 
(1919). 
 75. Clinton v. Int’l Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots of Am., Inc., 254 F.2d 370 (9th 
Cir. 1958). 
 76. Sea Lift, Inc. v. Refinadora Costarricense de Petroleo, S.A., 792 F.2d 989 (11th 
Cir. 1986); Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638 (1900). 
 77. See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742 (1961).  
 78. People’s Ferry Co. of Boston v. Beers, 61 U.S. 393 (1857); Herman Family 
Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 79. Exxon Corp. v. Cent. Gulf Lines, Inc., 500 U.S. 603 (1991). 
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maritime and non-maritime elements,83 the conceptual approach has been 
greatly complicated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Norfolk 
Southern Railway Co. v. Kirby 84 
C. Admiralty Jurisdiction: Mixed Contracts Generally 
A “mixed contract” is one that contains both maritime and non-
maritime elements.85 This very academic approach to whether a contract 
has enough of a “genuinely salty flavor”86 for maritime jurisdiction has 
presented difficulty for the courts in ascertaining whether the exercise of 
admiralty jurisdiction is proper with respect to mixed contracts. Defining 
the outer limits and scope of admiralty jurisdiction regarding contracts 
that contain both maritime and non-maritime elements has been 
described as “not the model of clarity.”87  
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Kirby, the test for whether a 
court could exercise admiralty jurisdiction over a mixed contract focused 
on the non-maritime elements of the contract. The now-overruled test 
held that where the non-maritime part of the contract (1) was merely 
incidental or (2) could be separated from the maritime portion of the 
contract, the court would exercise admiralty jurisdiction.88 Where, 
however, the maritime and non-maritime claims were bound together and 
could not be separated, the Court would refuse to exercise admiralty 
jurisdiction in order to hear the dispute, even as to disputes arising out of 
the maritime elements of the contract.89  
However, this now-antiquated jurisdictional test for mixed contracts 
that focused on the non-maritime elements of the contracts was 
completely abrogated by the Supreme Court in its 2004 decision, Norfolk 
Southern Railway Co. v. Kirby. In Kirby, the Supreme Court changed the 
jurisdictional landscape of federal courts with regard to admiralty 
jurisdiction and mixed contracts containing both maritime and non-
maritime elements, shifting the focus of the jurisdictional inquiry away 
from the non-maritime elements and instead focusing on the 
substantiality of the maritime elements.90 
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1. Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Kirby 
Kirby involved a contract for the carriage of goods (machinery) from 
Sydney, Australia to Huntsville, Alabama.91 The bill of lading was a 
through-bill and initially issued by a freight forwarder, covering the 
entire journey, designating Sydney, Australia as the port of loading, 
Savannah, Georgia as the port of discharge, and Huntsville, Alabama as 
the ultimate destination of delivery.92 The freight forwarder then 
contracted with a carrier that issued its own bill of lading designating the 
same ports of loading and discharge and ultimate destination.93 The 
carrier then contracted with Norfolk Southern Railway to handle the land 
leg of the carriage.94 The freight forwarder’s bill of lading included a 
Himalaya Clause extending the carrier’s protections to others involved in 
the transaction, but it did so at a rate higher than that of Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) ($500 per package); additionally, the 
second bill of lading issued by the carrier also included a Himalaya 
Clause, but it included a liability limitation extending the carrier’s 
protections to others involved in the transaction, and it did so at the 
limitation specified in COGSA ($500 per package).95 While in route 
from Savannah, Georgia to Huntsville, Alabama the train derailed and 
caused damage to the machinery shipped by the claimant.96 
Strictly regarding the jurisdictional aspect of Kirby, the Court was 
asked to decide “whether or not a suit brought to recover damages for 
property that was damaged on land while it was being transported by an 
overland carrier pursuant to a marine bill of lading [fell] within admiralty 
jurisdiction.”97 In answering the jurisdictional question, the Court looked 
to Exxon Corp. v. Century Gulf Lines, Inc.,98 which held that “[t]he trend 
in modern admiralty case law . . . is to focus the jurisdictional inquiry 
upon whether the nature of the transaction was maritime.”99 However, 
the Court went further and disregarded the old jurisdictional test 
requiring that either the non-maritime aspect of the contract be either 
                                                     
 91. Id. at 18. 
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incidental to the contract or separable from the maritime elements100 and 
instead chose to create a new test for determining whether it may 
exercise admiralty jurisdiction over a dispute involving a mixed 
contract.101   
According to the Court’s new rule, the focus was no longer on the 
non-maritime aspects of the contract. Instead, the Court held that 
exercise of admiralty jurisdiction over a mixed contract turned on the 
substantiality of the maritime aspects of the contract.102 Where the 
maritime aspects of the contract are “substantial,” the court may exercise 
admiralty jurisdiction over any dispute derived of that contract.103 The 
new rule proffered in Kirby has come to be known as the “primary 
objective test,”104 such that where the primary objective of the contract is 
maritime commerce, the court will exercise admiralty jurisdiction over 
the dispute despite the fact that the dispute may arise out of a shore-side 
incident.105 
In so deciding, the Court ruled that it could exercise its admiralty 
jurisdiction over the contractual dispute. While this outcome and the 
resulting rule make perfect sense when applied to mixed contracts for 
multi-modal transportation of goods or warehouse to warehouse cargo 
insurance policies, both of which revolve around the carriage of goods 
over land and sea legs, the same rule is not as easily applied to mixed 
contracts that do not involve an objective geographical, distance-related 
aspect, such as umbrella insurance policies. The determination of 
whether the maritime element of a mixed contract is substantial is 
significantly easier to apply when a court is able to compare mileages or 
examine whether the primary objective of the contract necessarily 
involved insurance coverage of goods or transportation of goods over the 
ocean. Moreover, the Kirby approach may even be viable with regard to 
master service agreements, in so far as a court is able to look to the 
“focus of the contract.”106 Conversely, determining the substantiality of 
the maritime elements of a mixed contract not involving movement of 
                                                     
 100. Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba, Sociadad Anonima v. Snobl, 363 F.2d 733, 
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 102. Id. at 26-27. 
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the subject of the contract has been far more beguiling of a concept and 
has proven to be a significantly more difficult task for courts to 
accomplish.  
2. Application of the Kirby Rule 
Much of the application of the jurisdictional test set out in Kirby has 
revolved around three areas, which include: (1) multi-modal transport 
contracts (carriage contemplated over sea and land like that litigated in 
Kirby), (2) master service contracts (also commonly called “blanket 
contracts”), and 3) bumbershoot or umbrella insurance policies (umbrella 
policies that provide primary or excess coverage for both maritime and 
shore-side risks). While these types of mixed contracts are the most 
litigated in reference to jurisdictional questions, they by no means form 
an exhaustive list of mixed contracts in which jurisdictional questions 
arise. As examined below, the courts are anything but uniform in their 
application of the Kirby test in determining whether they may properly 
exercise admiralty jurisdiction over the disputes arising out of the 
aforementioned common types of mixed contracts.107 
a. Multi-Modal Transportation Contracts 
Disputes over multi-modal transportation contracts involve the exact 
same types of dispute as was the case in Kirby, contemplating the 
carriage of goods over land and sea legs. The Kirby Rule holds that 
where the maritime portion of the contract is substantial, such that the 
primary objective of the contract is maritime commerce, then the fact 
that the contract also involves non-maritime elements does not affect a 
court’s ability to exercise admiralty jurisdiction over a dispute arising 
from that contract.108 Furthermore, determining whether the maritime 
                                                     
 107. It is worth mentioning that courts have not been willing to extend admiralty 
jurisdiction to contractual issues associated with damages for breach of contract (like 
payment of demurrage and detention costs), where the contract was primarily for the sale 
of goods, but it contemplated that the seller would ship the sold goods.  See e.g. 
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of demurrage or detention cost pursuant to a voyage charter party, yet the court refuses to 
exercise its admiralty jurisdiction over disputes over such contracts.  This seems 
counterintuitive as the contract for the sale of goods contemplates the transportation of 
the goods, the inclusion of the transportation terms are material to the contract of the sale 
of goods, and it would not be consummated but for the transportation of those goods to 
the buyer.    
 108. Kirby, 543 U.S. at 23-24. 
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element of a mixed contract is substantial is significantly easier to apply 
when a court is able to compare mileages or examine whether the 
primary objective of a given contract involved insurance coverage of 
goods or transportation of goods over the ocean. As a result, the 
jurisdictional test handed down in Kirby is not only very applicable in 
determining jurisdiction in these disputes, it also provides a level of 
foreseeability and predictability to parties to multi-modal transportation 
contracts, such that there are no surprises as to under which jurisdiction 
the court will hear a dispute. 
Much like multi-modal transportation contracts, open cargo 
insurance policies—providing warehouse to warehouse coverage—
present situations that have objectively measurable geographic elements 
that make the jurisdictional test delivered in Kirby easily applied. In fact, 
with regard to a court’s jurisdictional inquiry, warehouse to warehouse 
cargo insurance policies are more like multi-modal transportation 
contracts than they are like umbrella insurance policies. Following Kirby, 
the Eleventh Circuit cited in a footnote that open cargo policies that 
include warehouse to warehouse clauses are maritime policies.109 This is 
the case, like multi-modal transportation contracts, because a substantial 
portion of the contract is devoted to the coverage of cargo over the sea-
leg of transit. The best example of this assertion is the Tenth Circuit 
jurisdictional analysis in Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Sea 
Harvest Seafood Co.110 Even though this case was decided prior to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Kirby, the court’s analysis is remarkably 
similar to that which could be expected of a similar legal issue post-
Kirby. 
In Commercial Union Insurance Co., the insurer brought an action 
for a declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that it was not liable 
under a marine open cargo insurance policy for loss of 36,000 pounds of 
decomposed frozen shrimp.111 Prior to the above-cited controversy, Sea 
Harvest had contracted with Commercial Union for an ocean marine 
open cargo policy.112 The policy purported to cover the cargo to its final 
destination, to include overland transportation (warehouse to warehouse 
coverage).113 The policy included a temperature control provision 
whereby Commercial Union agreed to cover “[a]ll Risks of physical loss 
                                                     
 109. Great S. Wood Preserving, Inc. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 292 F. App’x 8, 10 
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 110. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sea Harvest Seafood Co., 251 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 
2001). 
 111. Id. at 1296.  
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 1298.  
18 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:1 
 
or damage from any external cause, but excluding: A. Deterioration, 
decay or spoilage unless the Assured can demonstrate that such damage 
was directly caused by derangement or breakdown of the refrigeration 
machinery or directly caused by the vessel stranding, sinking, burning or 
in collision.”114    
The controversy arose when Sea Harvest undertook shipping 36,000 
pounds of frozen shrimp from Bangkok, Thailand to Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania.115 The shipment of shrimp was to arrive in California and 
be transported by rail, first to Chicago, Illinois, and eventually on to 
Philadelphia.116 However, somewhere in transit, someone forgot to attach 
a gen-set (a device that provides power to a reefer unit) to the cargo 
container containing the shrimp.117 As a result of the mishap, the entire 
shipment of shrimp was spoiled.118 Sea Harvest subsequently made a 
claim to its insurer, Commercial Union, who then denied the claim.119 
The following day, Commercial Union commenced an action for 
declaratory judgment, contending that it was not responsible for the 
payment for Sea Harvest’s claim under the maritime insurance policy.120   
Following filing for declaratory judgment, Commercial Union then 
moved for summary judgment arguing that under admiralty law, the 
failure to plug in a gen-set did not constitute an external “derangement or 
breakdown of refrigeration machinery.”121 The district court agreed and 
granted Commercial Union’s motion for summary judgment.122 Sea 
Harvest timely appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its 
application of admiralty law to the interpretation of the contract.123 In 
determining whether admiralty law applied, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals did a “maritime contract” analysis to determine whether the 
“mixed contract” (as this policy covered cargo over the ocean transport 
as well as during land transport) was one that could be qualified as a 
maritime contract, the interpretation of which was to be done pursuant to 
admiralty law.124 Importantly, regardless of whether the claim is made in 
state court or in federal court sitting in either diversity or admiralty, 
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where the claim is a maritime controversy, the court will apply federal 
admiralty law.125  
In determining the applicable choice of law, the court used a 
jurisdictional analysis, due to the above mentioned choice of law rules in 
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen.126 In doing so, the court noted that while 
the policy was one that covered cargo, in this instance, the coverage of 
the cargo “involved significant maritime travel,”127 as “the shipment 
from Bangkok to Los Angeles was clearly the predominant part of the 
transaction.”128  Thus, the court held that the contract was a maritime 
contract,129 and coupled with the principles set out in Jensen,130 general 
maritime law applied, and the maritime interpretation of the terms of the 
contract controlled.131 Thus the Tenth Circuit has taken a geographic 
distance-type approach in determining whether the mixed contract was 
substantially maritime, such that the contact’s connection with maritime 
commerce was not “too speculative and attenuated to support admiralty 
and maritime jurisdiction.”132  
Although this case was decided prior to Kirby, given the similarity of 
this type of controversy to that of a multi-modal transportation contract 
dispute, it is likely that the jurisdictional test set out in Kirby is as easily 
applied to warehouse to warehouse marine cargo insurance contract 
cases as it is to other multi-modal transportation contractual disputes. 
Furthermore, based on the factual similarities between those in Kirby and 
those predominating disputes over this type of mixed contracts and 
warehouse to warehouse marine cargo insurance contracts, it makes 
sense that the jurisdictional test set out in Kirby works. This is the case 
because multi-modal transportation contracts and warehouse to 
warehouse open cargo insurance policies inherently contain an objective 
geographic measure by which to determine the substantiality of the 
maritime portions of the contract, thus making the Kirby test for 
admiralty jurisdiction an appropriate test. However, as will be discussed 
in further detail below, a different test or approach should be applied to 
situations that lack the spatial component of the aforementioned 
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contracts.133 As such, certain mixed contracts, such as umbrella 
insurance contracts or master service agreements that lack an objective, 
spatial, or geographic element, make the Kirby test somewhat 
inappropriate. As a result, it would be more advantageous for the 
Supreme Court to limit the application of Kirby to multi-modal 
transportation contracts and warehouse to warehouse marine cargo 
insurance contracts. 
b. Master Service Agreements 
Given the nature of the offshore oil industry, many contracts are 
what can be characterized as “master service contracts” or “blanket 
contracts.” Generally, these contracts may involve the provision of 
materials and supplies to an offshore fixed platform (which is considered 
an extension of land for the purpose of admiralty jurisdiction)134 by way 
of a vessel, and may also include a service agreement whereby the 
contracting party agrees to do maintenance work on the fixed platform. 
As a result, these contracts necessarily include maritime and non-
maritime components. With regard to this particular type of mixed 
contract, courts’ exercise of admiralty jurisdiction has serious 
implications regarding enforceability of these contracts or specific 
provisions therein. 
In determining whether a master service contract or blanket contract 
is a maritime contract subject to a court’s admiralty jurisdiction, the Fifth 
Circuit has taken the lead in fashioning a jurisdictional test for 
determining when the maritime elements of a master service agreement 
are “substantial” so as to comport with Kirby. Prior to the Fifth Circuit’s 
2009 decision in Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC,135 the 
test for when a master service agreement was “salty” enough was that 
enunciated in Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp.136   
Davis & Sons involved a contract whereby Davis & Sons, Inc. would 
provide barges in order to transport its own employees to do maintenance 
work on defendant’s offshore drilling rig, including: painting living 
quarters, cranes and other equipment; inspecting and repairing engines 
and cranes; and operating and navigating the barge.137 Importantly, the 
contract also included an indemnity clause, whereby Davis & Sons 
                                                     
 133. See infra Section III(C)(2)(c). 
 134. Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 360 (5th Cir. 1969). 
 135. 589 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 136. Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 919 F.2d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 137. Id. at 314. 
2015] Mixed Contracts 21 
 
would be forced to indemnify Gulf Oil in the event a Davis employee 
was injured on a Gulf Oil rig and sued Gulf Oil.138 In Davis & Sons the 
court fashioned a now-antiquated test for determining whether a mixed 
master service agreement was maritime in nature and could be decided 
under the exercise of the court’s admiralty jurisdiction.139 In doing so, the 
court created a multi-factored approach to determine whether the 
contract was substantially a maritime contract, holding: 
[the] [d]etermination of the nature of a contract depends in part 
on historical treatment in the jurisprudence and in part on a fact-
specific inquiry. We consider six factors in characterizing the 
contract: 1) what does the specific work order in effect at the 
time of injury provide? 2) what work did the crew assigned 
under the work order actually do? 3) was the crew assigned to 
work aboard a vessel in navigable waters? 4) to what extent did 
the work being done relate to the mission of that vessel? 5) what 
was the principal work of the injured worker? and 6) what work 
was the injured worker actually doing at the time of injury?140 
Based on those factors, the court found that the contract was a maritime 
contract despite the non-maritime elements and was thus subject to the 
court’s admiralty jurisdiction.141 This designation was of significant 
importance, and it illustrates the legal implications that result from 
litigating a dispute under the Fifth Circuit’s admiralty jurisdiction. Here, 
as a result of the court’s finding that the contract was a maritime 
contract, subject to the court’s admiralty jurisdiction, federal maritime 
law applied, and, as a result, the indemnity provision was valid and 
enforceable.142 Had the contract not been a maritime contract, Louisiana 
law would have applied and the indemnity clause would have been 
unenforceable. 
Since the Davis & Sons decision, the Fifth Circuit has attempted to 
simplify their factor-based test’s focus on the locale of the injury that 
gave rise to the contractual dispute, and in doing so, keeping with Kirby 
by focusing on the primary objective of the contract to determine the 
substantiality of the maritime elements.143 Similar to Davis & Sons, 
Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC 144 addressed whether a 
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contract was a maritime contract that should be heard pursuant to the 
court’s admiralty jurisdiction and decided according to federal maritime 
law, and subsequently whether the indemnity provision should be upheld 
as valid.145 To find that the contracts were not maritime contracts would 
require the court to decide the controversy pursuant to federal question 
jurisdiction based on the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,146 which 
would result in applying the adjacent state’s law, here Louisiana, and 
find the indemnity provisions invalid.147 
In Grand Isle Shipyard,148 the Fifth Circuit modified the Davis & 
Sons test to a “focus-of-the-contract test,”149 which looks to where the 
contract contemplates that most of the work will be performed, rather 
than where a majority of the work was actually performed.150 The court 
found where most of the work called for by the contract is on stationary 
platforms located on the Outer Continental Shelf, the contract is 
considered as a non-maritime contract to be decided pursuant to the 
adjacent state’s law,151 because courts treat stationary platforms as 
extensions of land.152 However, if a majority of the work contemplated in 
the contract is aboard vessels on navigable water, then the contract is a 
maritime contract and subject to the court’s admiralty jurisdiction 
regardless of non-maritime elements included in the contract.153 
Based on this new test, the Fifth Circuit found that “because the 
relevant contract contemplated that a majority of the contractor’s work 
would be performed on stationary platforms on the [Outer Continental 
Shelf], this should be deemed the relevant ‘situs’ for the instant 
indemnity dispute and because none of the other factors lead us to apply 
any other law, we must apply Louisiana law.”154  Thus, the court found 
that the indemnity provisions in each of the contracts were invalid.155 
As a result, when it comes to master service agreements, the Fifth 
Circuit has taken the lead in Grand Isle Shipyard on formulating 
jurisdictional tests, creating a “focus-of-the-contract test.”156 This “focus-
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of-the-contract test” holistically looks at the entirety of a contract to 
determine where the majority of the work is contemplated, subsequently 
determining whether the contract is a maritime contract to justify the 
exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction. Moreover, given the difficulty 
presented in applying the Kirby test to determine whether the court has 
admiralty jurisdiction over a mixed contract such as a master service 
agreement—a contract that lacks the spatial or geographic elements 
inherent in multi-modal transportation contracts and warehouse to 
warehouse marine cargo insurance policies—it appears that the Fifth 
Circuit approach is the best test for determining admiralty jurisdiction.  
This is the case as the Grand Isle Shipyard test comports with the Kirby 
test’s required focus on the substantiality of the maritime elements of the 
contract.157 In doing so, the Fifth Circuit takes a holistic approach to the 
mixed contract to determine the “saltiness”158 of the contract, without the 
benefit of a spatial or geographically measurable element.    
This line of cases illustrates the difficulty presented in applying the 
factually specific test handed down in Kirby to factually dissimilar 
situations. On the other hand, Grand Isle Shipyard is exemplary of the 
Fifth Circuit’s success in dealing with mixed contract and the Kirby test. 
In addition to the jurisdictional inquiry, Grand Isle Shipyard also 
illustrates the very significant legal implications and consequences that 
accompany the court’s decision in hearing a dispute pursuant to its 
admiralty jurisdiction. As has been discussed, Kirby is applicable in 
multi-modal transportation contracts, warehouse to warehouse marine 
cargo insurance policies, and to some extent, master service 
agreements;159 however the applicability ends there. When it comes to 
umbrella marine insurance policies, Kirby is lacking because courts have 
not determined the best way to determine the primary objective of the 
contract. Furthermore, when it comes to umbrella insurance policies, 
looking at the contract alone leads to potentially anomalous results, such 
as litigating shore-side coverage for shore-side injuries before a court 
sitting in admiralty. Thus, where Kirby may be applied in the above-
discussed types of mixed contracts, the courts should apply a different 
and more appropriate test to determine admiralty jurisdiction for marine 
umbrella insurance policies. 
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c. Marine Insurance 
The Supreme Court of the United States has made it clear that 
marine insurance policies are contracts squarely within the purview of 
the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction.160 However, there is no concrete 
precedent as to how the Court is to treat mixed insurance contracts—
those that cover both shore-side and sea-side risks under the umbrella of 
a single policy—when determining whether the contract is a maritime 
contract within the parameters of the Courts’ admiralty jurisdiction. This 
issue was less difficult under the pre-Kirby test that held where the non-
maritime part of the contract was (1) merely incidental or (2) could be 
separated from the maritime portion of the contract, the Court would 
exercise admiralty jurisdiction.161 Where, however, the maritime and 
non-maritime claims were bound together and could not be separated, the 
Court would refuse to exercise admiralty jurisdiction in order to hear the 
dispute, even as to disputes arising out of the maritime elements of the 
contract.162 The post-Kirby jurisdictional inquiry is significantly more 
arduous.   
Unlike the case of other multi-modal transportation contracts and, to 
a lesser extent, master service agreements, the various Circuit Courts 
have had a universally difficult and varying approach to applying the 
jurisdictional test as set out in Kirby to bumbershoot and umbrella 
insurance policies.163 Due to the difficulty the courts have encountered in 
implementing Kirby in these mixed coverage insurance policies, the 
several Circuit Courts have come out with various methods of 
application.164 The varying methods of application present the shipping 
industry and the insurance industry with a lack of uniformity or 
predictability. This lack of uniformity or predictability is counterintuitive 
to the goal of uniformity to which courts have aspired, and for this 
reason, the courts should limit the application of Kirby to those types of 
contracts discussed above. With regard to umbrella insurance policies, 
courts should adhere to a test similar to that asserted in Folksamerica 
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Reinsurance Co. v. Clean Water of New York, Inc.165 to provide 
practitioners with a more predictable landscape within which to 
negotiate, draft umbrella insurance policies, and litigate disputes arising 
therefrom. 
Below is an overview of the different methods with which the Circuit 
Courts have dealt with Kirby in determining whether the umbrella policy 
in question is a maritime contract subject to admiralty jurisdiction. A 
review of these several tests makes it obvious that the Second Circuit’s is 
the best approach due to its threshold inquiry into the nature of the 
dispute, ensuring that anomalous disputes are not unnaturally litigated in 
a court sitting in admiralty. Moreover, the court’s follow up examination 
into the scope of the coverage most closely aligns with the conceptual 
approach historically emphasized in American jurisprudence while also 
adhering to the jurisdictional test as set forth in Kirby.166 
i. The Second Circuit: Folksamerica Reinsurance Co. v. Clean 
Water of New York, Inc. 
At issue in Folksamerica was a comprehensive general liability 
policy that contained a ship-repairer’s legal liability policy that 
effectively provided umbrella coverage for Clean Water’s operations. In 
this case, an employee who worked for a company with whom Clean 
Water had subcontracted was injured while cleaning the oil tanks of a 
barge.167 The employee brought a negligence claim in state court against 
Clean Water.168 Following the initiation of the suit, Clean Water notified 
its insurer of the action, and the insurer’s successor in interest, 
Folksamerica, filed suit in the Eastern District of New York seeking a 
declaration that it had no duty to indemnify or defend Clean Water.169 
Clean Water moved for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
arguing that the CGL section of the Policy was a standard “all risk 
policy” and contended that the maritime risks covered by the Policy were 
“merely incidental” at best.170 The District Court agreed that the 
maritime portions of the contract were merely incidental to the non-
maritime elements and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, holding that the policy was neither wholly nor primarily 
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maritime in nature, and that the court only had admiralty jurisdiction 
where “the non-maritime elements were merely incidental in an 
otherwise maritime contract,”171 and the CGL section was not incidental. 
Following the District Court’s dismissal, Folksamerica appealed.172 
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the 
District Court had failed to apply Kirby. However, in doing its own 
jurisdictional analysis by applying Kirby, the court went beyond Kirby’s 
“primary objective” inquiry and held that before it could inquire into the 
subject matter of the contract, it must first make a “threshold inquiry” 
into the subject matter of the dispute.”173 The Court held that “[b]efore 
attempting to categorize contractual rights as maritime or non-maritime, 
a federal court must first consider whether an issue related to maritime 
interests has been raised.”174  In so holding, rather than focusing directly 
on the nature and subject matter of the contract itself to determine if the 
contract was substantially a maritime contract, the court chose as a 
threshold inquiry to focus on the nature of the dispute and to only then 
look at the subject matter of the contract by analyzing the terms of 
coverage in the policy to determine if the policy’s “primary objective” 
was maritime in nature. In its threshold inquiry regarding the subject 
matter of the dispute, the court held that the parties’ dispute concerned 
“an insurance claim based on a ship-maintenance-related injury sustained 
by a ship oil-tank cleaner aboard an ocean-going vessel in navigable 
waters. The business of ship maintenance has long been recognized as 
maritime, and the insurance claim arising out of a related onboard injury 
has more than a ‘speculative and attenuated’ connection with maritime 
commerce.”175After satisfying its threshold inquiry, the court went on to 
examine the subject matter of the contract itself by “examining the scope 
of policy coverage to determine whether primary objective is to 
accomplish the transportation of goods by sea,” as required by Kirby. 176 
In order to examine the subject matter of the contract, the court 
focused on the actual coverage and risks assumed by the insurer in the 
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policy. In looking at risks covered, the Court noted that the “operations 
hazards” and “products hazards” were maritime in nature because they 
could encompass personal injury or property damage arising out of 
defective or faulty repair of a vessel or other hazards that could be 
associated with maritime activity.177 Additionally, the court noted that 
the CGL policy also covered pollution.178 Given the above coverages, 
taken with ship-repairers’ legal liability coverage that included a 
“travelling workmen clause” extending coverage to work “on board the 
Vessel and/or Drilling Rig at sea or in any port for the purpose of 
effecting repairs and/or other work entrusted to the Assured . . . .179 the 
court found that the policy was a maritime contract and, therefore, 
exercised admiralty jurisdiction over the dispute.180 As a result of the 
court’s holding that the umbrella policy was a maritime contract, it 
vacated the District Court’s dismissal.181 
As can be seen, in reconciling the Supreme Court’s holding in Kirby 
with umbrella insurance policies, the Second Circuit used a threshold 
inquiry regarding the subject matter of the dispute prior to even 
examining the subject matter of the contract in order to determine 
whether the maritime elements of the contract were “substantial.” Only 
after satisfying itself that the dispute was a maritime dispute did the court 
turn its attention to the terms of the contract by focusing on the scope of 
the coverage, to determine if the mixed contract’s maritime elements 
were substantial enough to justify the court’s exercise of admiralty 
jurisdiction. This is clearly a better approach to a jurisdictional test, 
especially when it comes to umbrella insurance policies.  This approach 
ensures that anomalous disputes are not litigated before a court sitting in 
admiralty, and the subsequent inquiry into the policy coverages of the 
contract ensures that the jurisdictional requirements of Kirby are 
satisfied.   
Due to the fact that the jurisdictional test handed down in Kirby only 
applies neatly to situations that have an objective geographic measure by 
which to determine the substantiality of the maritime portions of the 
contract, such as multi-modal transportation contracts and warehouse to 
warehouse open cargo policies, a different test or approach should be 
applied to situations that lack the spatial component of the 
aforementioned contracts. Given this fact, the Second Circuit approach 
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discussed above, or some derivative version of this approach, (like that 
which the Fifth Circuit has employed), is the most appropriate approach 
for determining whether a court has admiralty jurisdiction in disputes 
arising out of umbrella coverage insurance policies. Under this approach, 
a court first inquires whether there are maritime issues, and then it 
determines whether it has admiralty jurisdiction by analyzing the nature 
of the contract by way of the broad coverages expressed in the policy.   
ii. The Sixth Circuit: New Hampshire Insurance Co. v. Home 
Savings & Loan Co. of Youngstown, Ohio182 
Unlike the Second Circuit’s approach of engaging in an initial 
inquiry as to the subject matter of the dispute, followed by an 
examination of the policy coverage to determine if the policy was 
primarily a maritime contract, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals instead 
chose to dispense with the threshold inquiry regarding the “saltiness”183 
of the dispute and instead skip straight to focusing on the “interests 
insured” to determine if the policy was enough of a maritime contract to 
justify admiralty jurisdiction.184 While this approach determines whether 
a particular umbrella insurance policy is “salty”185 enough to justify 
admiralty jurisdiction better than a pure Kirby approach, it is not as 
effective as the Second Circuit’s approach previously discussed. This is 
because the Sixth Circuit approach lacks the practicality and 
predictability of the Second Circuit’s approach. As such, while the Sixth 
Circuit approach is better than a purist application of Kirby, the Second 
Circuit’s initial inquiry into the nature of the dispute more effectively 
keeps maritime matters within the courts admiralty jurisdiction and keeps 
shore-side matters on the land-side of the court’s jurisdiction.   
In New Hampshire Insurance Co. v. Home Savings & Loan Co. of 
Youngstown, Ohio, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals grappled with how 
best to determine the maritime nature of a “Yacht Dealer/Marina 
Operator’s” general liability insurance policy in order to determine 
whether it could hear the case pursuant to its admiralty jurisdiction.186 
The policy was purchased by National Marine, Inc. (“National Marine”) 
from New Hampshire Insurance Co. (“NHIC”).187 The policy covered 
                                                     
 182. N.H. Ins. Co. v. Home Sav. & Loan Co. of Youngstown, Ohio, 581 F.3d 420 (6th 
Cir. 2009). 
 183. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742 (1961). 
 184. N.H. Ins. Co., 581 F.3d at 427. 
 185. Kossick, 365 U.S. at 742. 
 186. N.H. Ins. Co., 581 F.3d at 423, 427. 
 187. Id. at 422.  
2015] Mixed Contracts 29 
 
National Marine for both “Yacht Dealer Operations” and “Marina 
Operations” covering loss or damage to its inventory, loss or damage to 
third-party property while in its custody, personal injury or property 
damage occurring on its boats or at its marina, and loss or damage to its 
tools and equipment, but expressly excluding coverage for “owned 
watercraft.”188 The policy also included $300,000 in “Truth in Lending 
Errors and Omissions Liability Coverage” to insure against any damage 
due to “the unintentional violation of any Federal or State Consumer 
Credit Act, or similar statute, law or ordinance.”189 Several of National 
Marine’s customers and two banks sued, alleging that National Marine 
made fraudulent misrepresentations and failed to deliver certain boats 
with clean title.190 In response, National Marine filed a claim with NHIC 
under the “Truth in Lending” provision of the policy, requesting legal 
defense and indemnification from the charges.191 NHIC initially paid the 
claim but reserved its right to contest. It filed suit designating the case as 
one falling under the court’s admiralty jurisdiction and asked the district 
court to rescind the policy (on misrepresentation grounds) or declare that 
it did not cover these charges.192 The defendants then made a motion to 
dismiss pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, arguing that, because 
prior state court proceedings would resolve the same factual and legal 
disputes between the same parties, the federal court could abstain from 
the exercise of jurisdiction.193 After a three-year stay in litigation due to 
an ongoing bankruptcy proceeding, the district court dismissed the case 
without prejudice.194 As a basis for its dismissal the court held that, 
because Declaratory Judgment Act did not provide for its own federal 
subject matter jurisdiction, “it would assume subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) because the insurance policy at issue 
was a ‘marine insurance policy,’” and dismiss the claim without 
prejudice because the facts and law of the case supported discretionary 
abstention.195   
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals determined it would 
examine the basis for admiralty jurisdiction sua sponte before it could 
adequately review the legal basis for the lower court’s dismissal.196 The 
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Court immediately recognized that if the dispute were to be heard under 
its admiralty jurisdiction, it would have to be determined to be a 
maritime contract.197  Furthermore, given that the policy was an umbrella 
policy that covered seemingly maritime risks and apparently non-
maritime risks, it determined it would have to do a mixed contracts 
inquiry to determine whether the case could be heard under its admiralty 
jurisdiction pursuant to the rule handed down in Kirby.198 In doing so, 
rather than following the Second Circuit’s approach and engaging in an 
initial inquiry as to the subject matter of the dispute, followed by an 
examination of the policy coverage to determine if the policy is primarily 
a maritime contract, the court chose to disregard the initial inquiry into 
the subject matter of the dispute. Rather than focus on the policy 
coverage, it focused instead on the “interests insured” to determine if the 
policy was enough of a maritime contract to justify admiralty 
jurisdiction.199 In focusing its inquiry on the interests insured to 
determine if the contract was one in which the primary objective was 
maritime commerce, the court cited that, with regard to the yacht-dealer 
provisions of the policy, the interests insured only included boats as 
objects of commerce, treated as “stock for sale,” not as agents of 
maritime commerce and, as a result, did “not relate to maritime 
commerce.200 The Court went on to hold that with regard to the Marina 
Operator’s coverage, the policy really only covered fixed structures and 
the operation of the marina rather than vessels in it.201 Based on the 
above analysis, the court held that the contract was not one for which the 
primary objective was maritime commerce and consequently dismissed 
the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.202   
While this is a correct outcome, the process and analysis were 
unnecessary and convoluted. In this case, rather than go through a drawn 
out analysis of “interests insured,” the Court could have very quickly 
dispensed with the issue of whether it could exercise its admiralty 
jurisdiction in the matter by utilizing the threshold inquiry into the 
“nature of the dispute” approach. If this were done, the Court could have 
skipped any other legal determination. This case was about a truth in 
lending insurance claim and had very little to do with admiralty 
jurisdiction or law, and it could have been quickly dispensed with as 
such. Whereas this case provides an excellent example of a different 
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approach to applying the Kirby jurisdictional test to an umbrella 
insurance policy, it makes for a better argument in favor of the 
application of the Second Circuit approach as a way of simplifying 
jurisdictional determinations in situations involving mixed contracts, as 
was illustrated in the above discussion. Moreover, determining the “salty 
flavor”203 of an insurance policy by focusing on the “interests insured” is 
not substantially different from the Second Circuit’s focus on policy 
coverage and should not yield different results, but it does require drawn 
out and convoluted analyses which degrade uniformity and 
predictability. As such, the utilization of a Second Circuit threshold 
inquiry into the nature of the dispute would not only relieve courts of the 
necessity of doing convoluted and abstract jurisdictional analyses where 
the dispute itself has no ties to the water, but it would also provide a 
more common sense application of admiralty jurisdiction.   
iii. The Fifth Circuit: St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. 
Board of Commissioners of Port of New Orleans204 
In determining whether a court may exercise admiralty jurisdiction in 
order to hear a dispute arising out of an umbrella insurance policy 
providing both shore-side and sea-side coverage, the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals utilizes a hybrid of the Second Circuit and the Sixth Circuit 
Courts of Appeals approaches. In doing so, like the Second Circuit, the 
Fifth Circuit first examines the terms of coverage to determine if the 
primary objective of the contract was maritime commerce; but then, like 
the Sixth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit determines the focus of the contract by 
examining the “interests insured.”205 While this approach certainly does 
focus on the contract itself and those interests involved in the contract, 
almost to a fault, the Fifth Circuit’s failure to engage in a Second Circuit 
threshold inquiry into the nature of the dispute removes any common 
sense from a supposed jurisdictional test. As the below discussion 
illustrates, failure to engage in a threshold dispute inquiry results in odd 
jurisdictional consequences, such as litigation over shore-side insurance 
coverage for damages for a shore-side injury. 
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Board of Commissioners of 
Port of New Orleans involved a “bumbershoot” policy, which is 
                                                     
 203. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742 (1961). 
 204. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Port of New Orleans, 646 F. 
Supp. 2d 813 (E.D. La. 2009) aff’d 418 F. App’x 305 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 205. Id. at 819. 
32 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:1 
 
essentially an umbrella policy.206 Here the policy was issued by St. Paul 
Fire and Marine Insurance Co. (“St. Paul”) to the Board of 
Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans (“the Port”) and provided 
excess coverage for liabilities that exceeded the specific underlying 
policies, and filled the liability gaps where the underlying policies failed 
to cover other liabilities.207 The underlying policies included coverage 
for: 1) comprehensive general liability, 2) auto liability, 3) worker’s 
compensation, 4) employer’s liability, 5) maritime employer’s liability, 
6) Jones Act coverage, 7) protection and indemnity (P&I) for crew and 
employees, as well as, collision and towers, 8) vessel pollution, and 9) 
public official’s liability.208 In addition to the above coverages, the policy 
also included a notice of occurrence provision, whereby the Port was to 
give notice to St. Paul as “‘soon as practicable’ whenever the Port ‘may 
reasonably conclude that an occurrence covered [under the policy] 
involve[d] an event likely to involve [the] Policy’” (judgment/settlement 
in excess of USD 1,000,000.00).209 In addition to the notice provision, 
the policy also contained a New York choice of law provision.210 
The coverage dispute arose when a port worker was injured when the 
large lift truck (commonly known as a “top loader”) that he was 
operating fell into a pothole in an open area of the France Road Terminal 
(known as the “marshaling yard”) in July of 2001.211 In 2002, the worker 
filed suit against the Port.212 The Louisiana court held that, while the area 
in which the worker was operating the vehicle was leased to his 
employer, P&O Ports of Louisiana, it was owned by the Port. As a result 
of the Port’s ownership of the area and the Louisiana statute, La. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 9:3221 (2005), that maintains the owner’s liability for 
injuries that occur due to a known defect, the court held the Port liable 
for the worker’s injuries.  As a result, the trial court entered a judgment 
for $2.6 million in favor of the injured worker, as well as $50,000 for a 
loss of consortium claim by the worker’s wife, on February 28, 2007, 
which was then amended on March 23, 2007.213 The Louisiana Court of 
Appeals then affirmed this judgment on May 14, 2008.214 However, the 
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Port had failed to give St. Paul the required notice of occurrence until 
March 28, 2007, one month after the initial judgment, and five days 
following the amended judgment.215 Based on the Port’s failure to give 
the required notice until after the amended judgment, St. Paul brought 
suit under the Fifth Circuit’s admiralty jurisdiction seeking a declaration 
“that that the Port was not entitled to coverage based on a policy 
provision requiring that the insured send notice ‘as soon as practicable’ 
whenever it ‘may reasonably conclude that an occurrence covered [under 
the policy] involves an event likely to involve [the] Policy.’”216   
With regard to admiralty jurisdiction, the Port argued that the 
bumbershoot policy was not a maritime contract because it was a mixed 
contract and covered several shore-side risks and was meant only as an 
excess and gap-filling policy. In analyzing whether its admiralty subject 
matter jurisdictional requirements were met, the Court utilized a Second 
Circuit/Sixth Circuit hybrid approach. In the first prong of the Fifth 
Circuit’s jurisdictional test, the court utilized the second prong of the 
Second Circuit’s test and did a “policy coverage analysis.” In doing so, 
the Court held that, “[t]he terms of the bumbershoot policy here provided 
excess coverage to other maritime insurance contracts and specifically 
included traditional marine coverages. The fact that the coverage also 
included some land-based operations of the Port [was] not dispositive 
because the functioning and purpose of the Port show that the conceptual 
focus of the policy is maritime commerce.”217 Having satisfied itself that 
the coverage provided by the policy was primarily maritime, the Court 
then engaged in a Sixth Circuit “interests insured” analysis. In doing so, 
the Court recognized that the interests insured encompassed the port and 
its operation as such. The Court stated that “the Port is specifically 
charged with the statutory duty to ‘regulate the commerce and traffic of 
the port and harbor of New Orleans.’”218 The Court went on to recite that 
“[t]he Port’s operations, although partially land-based, are thus 
inextricably related to maritime commerce.”219 The Court concluded by 
stating, “[g]iven the type of policy, the marine coverages and inclusion 
of specific vessels, and the statutory duty of the Port to regulate the 
commerce at the harbor and port of New Orleans . . . the nature and 
character of the contract focused on maritime commerce,”220 and the 
exercise of admiralty jurisdiction was appropriate as a result.    
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This case is a good example of the Fifth Circuit’s attempt to 
hybridize existing approaches in order to both: one, mold a jurisdictional 
test that determines the “saltiness”221 of a marine insurance umbrella 
policy and; two, to comply with the test handed down in Kirby. More 
importantly, this case illustrates the significance of the legal implications 
associated with litigating a contractual dispute before a court sitting in 
admiralty. In this case, the Port contested admiralty jurisdiction in order 
to avoid admiralty choice of law rules. This is the case as “under 
admiralty law, where the parties have included a choice of law clause, 
[the named] state’s law will govern unless the state has no substantial 
relationship to the parties or the transaction or the state’s law conflicts 
with the fundamental purposes of maritime law.”222 In the event the court 
did not have admiralty jurisdiction and was only sitting in diversity, the 
law of the state with the most significant contacts would have applied. In 
this case, Louisiana had the most significant contacts and would have 
applied, and, because Louisiana law prohibited the inclusion of choice-
of-law clauses that apply non-Louisiana law to an insurance policy 
issued or delivered in the state, the New York choice of law clause would 
have been invalid. In short, had the court not exercised admiralty 
jurisdiction, the notice of occurrence provision would have been 
interpreted according to Louisiana law, which requires a showing of 
prejudice, rather than New York law, which does not require a showing 
of prejudice, to hold a policy void for late notice of occurrence. This 
difference would have changed the entire outcome of the case. Finally, in 
addition to illustrating the Fifth Circuit’s jurisdictional approach to 
mixed contracts and further illustrating the implications of such a 
designation, this case is an excellent display of the virtue of the Second 
Circuit’s threshold inquiry into the subject matter of the dispute. Here a 
court sitting in admiralty decided a case involving insurance coverage for 
a land-based injury. This is anomalous and inappropriate. Had the Court 
utilized the Second Circuit approach, this anomalous result would not 
have been the case. So, while this does not necessarily present any new 
doctrine, this is a didactic case insofar as it illustrates the consequences 
of litigating a coverage dispute over an umbrella policy before a court 
sitting in admiralty. 
iv. The Ninth Circuit: Sentry Select Insurance Co. v. Royal 
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Insurance Co. of America 
Unlike the Second Circuit, the Sixth Circuit, or the Fifth Circuit, the 
Ninth Circuit utilizes a holistic “all encompassing”-type approach; rather 
than focusing on the policy coverage or the interests insured, the Court 
looks at the entire policy to determine if the primary or “principal 
objective of [the] contract [was] maritime commerce.”223 This approach 
is surprisingly similar to the Fifth Circuit’s approach to determining the 
“saltiness”224 of a master service agreement as embodied in Grand Isle 
Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC. However, when applied to marine 
insurance umbrella policies, this approach is untenable and essentially 
makes the court’s admiralty jurisdiction discretionary in that it allows the 
court to look at the entire contract (without enunciating factors or 
specific waypoints) and decide whether it feels “salty” enough to 
exercise admiralty jurisdiction.  
The dispute in Sentry Select Insurance Co. v. Royal Insurance Co. of 
America, came about as a result of a coverage dispute regarding an 
excess/umbrella policy and a shore-side injury.225 The insurance 
coverage dispute involved an accident, which happened on land during 
the transfer of a prefabricated house to a remote construction site.226 
Kelly-Ryan, a Seattle, Washington based construction company, was in 
the business of shipping prefabricated houses from Washington to 
Alaska, where Kelly-Ryan then installed the houses in Native Alaskan 
villages pursuant to a contract with the federal government.227 Kelly-
Ryan transported the prefabricated houses from Washington to Alaska by 
barge, and upon arrival to Alaska, Kelly-Ryan then transferred the 
houses from the barges to “house movers,” which were used to transport 
the houses to their final construction site, where Kelly-Ryan would 
install the houses.228 On one shipment, “a maritime employee of Kelly-
Ryan working on the tugboat . . . was electrocuted while he was helping 
a Kelly-Ryan shore-based crew deliver a prefabricated house to a 
building site located approximately one and a half miles from the 
shore.”229 
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At the time of the accident, Kelly-Ryan had insurance coverage for 
its crewmembers and other vessel operations by way of a protection and 
indemnity (P&I) policy subscribed to by Sentry Select and Lloyd’s.230 In 
addition to the P&I coverage, Kelly-Ryan also had a shore-side 
employee-related injury liability coverage policy issued by Alaska 
National.231 The Alaska National Policy was split into two parts. Part 
One included coverage for “Washington and Alaska State workers’ 
compensation, unemployment, and disability claims, as well as claims 
under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. . . . Part 
Two of the Alaska National policy, the employers’ liability portion, 
provide[d] coverage for bodily injuries arising out of and in the course of 
employment, but exclude[d] ‘any obligation imposed by workers 
compensation . . . law.’”232 In addition to the above coverages, Kelly-
Ryan had also obtained excess/umbrella coverage from Royal Insurance 
Company of America (“Royal”) by way of Royal’s “Big Shield” 
policy.233 The “Big Shield policy provided excess coverage over Part 
Two of the Alaska National policy, Kelly-Ryan’s automobile insurance, 
and Kelly-Ryan’s Commercial General Liability (‘CGL’) policy with 
Alaska National.”234 However, the Big Shield policy did not provide 
excess coverage for claims covered “under Part One of the Alaska 
National policy or the P&I policies,” nor did the policy cover workers’ 
compensation due to an exclusion “excepting from coverage ‘[a]ny 
obligation of the insured under a workers compensation . . . law.’”235 In 
addition to the “Big Shield” policy, Kelly-Ryan also 
obtained from Royal an Marine Employer’s Liability (MEL) 
endorsement to Part Two of the Alaska National policy 
(employers’ liability) and the Royal Big Shield policy. The MEL 
endorsement extended coverage for bodily injuries suffered by a 
‘master or member of the crew of any vessel’ performing work 
‘necessary or incidental’ to the following tasks: ‘Painting and/or 
scraping of decks of tugs or barges, and loading and unloading as 
applicable in Washington and Alaska.’236  
The MEL endorsement provided coverage for losses in excess of one 
million dollars.  
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Following the accident and a failed attempt to file for workers 
compensation, the maritime employee filed suit under the Jones Act, and 
Kelly-Ryan and its P&I insurers ended up settling the maritime 
employee’s claim for $5,276,630.47.237Kelly-Ryan and its P&I 
underwriters then brought action against Alaska National and later 
Royal, pursuant to the court’s admiralty jurisdiction, seeking a 
declaration of coverage. Royal eventually moved for summary judgment 
arguing that, since the policy in controversy was a marine insurance 
contract and the suit was brought under the court’s admiralty jurisdiction, 
general maritime law applied, and based on the doctrine of “uberrimea 
fidei,”238 “the policy was void ab inito because Kelly-Ryan had failed to 
disclose that employees would be handling high-voltage power lines.”239 
The District Court granted Royal’s motion for summary judgment. On 
appeal, Kelly-Ryan challenged the court’s admiralty jurisdiction and the 
applicability of uberrimea fidei.240   
Prior to analyzing whether the contractual dispute satisfied the 
jurisdictional requirements for admiralty jurisdiction, the Court made it 
clear that either party (including the plaintiff) may attack subject matter 
jurisdiction at any point in the litigation as subject matter jurisdiction 
may not be waived nor may a party be estopped from raising it as an 
issue.241 Having dispensed with the issue of whether Kelly-Ryan had 
waived subject matter jurisdiction or was estopped from raising it as an 
issue, the Court went onto do a mixed contract admiralty jurisdiction 
analysis. In regards to the ability of the Court to exercise admiralty 
jurisdiction over the contractual dispute itself, the Court noted that the 
umbrella policy was a mixed contract insofar as it provided some 
maritime and non-maritime coverage. In determining whether the court 
could exercise admiralty jurisdiction to hear the dispute, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals used an approach unlike any of the other Circuit 
Courts of Appeal. Unlike either the Second Circuit, the Sixth Circuit, or 
the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals took an “all 
encompassing” view of the contract, and, rather than focusing on the 
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policy coverage or the interests insured, the Court looked at the entire 
policy holistically to determine if the “primary or principal objective of 
the contract is the establishment of policies of marine insurance.”242 In 
utilizing this holistic approach, the Court noted that the only maritime 
portion of the excess coverage provided by the “Big Shield” policy was 
that contained in the MEL endorsement.243 The Court went on to explain 
that, while the MEL endorsement provided coverage for “bodily injury to 
a master or member of the crew of a vessel, the description of the work 
covered under the MEL” was “confined to the typical shore-side 
activities of ‘[p]ainting and/or scrubbing of decks of tugs or barges, and 
loading and unloading as applicable in Washington and Alaska.’”244 As a 
result, given the totality of the contract, the excess policy’s primary 
objective was not maritime commerce, and, as a result, the court did not 
have original admiralty jurisdiction to hear the dispute over the excess 
policy’s coverage.245 
As can be seen by the above brief explanation of Sentry Select 
Insurance Co.,246 the Ninth Circuit lacks a definable test. Whereas the 
Ninth Circuit sort of determines the saltiness247 of the contract using a 
“primary objective”-type test which sort of seeks to determine the scope 
of the contract by looking at coverages, the Court does not actually come 
up with a distinctive test that looks at concrete factors such as 1) the 
nature of the dispute, 2) the scope of coverage as is specified on the four 
corners of the policy, or even 3) interests insured.  This is an altogether 
undesirable methodology because this approach makes it impossible to 
predict whether or not a court will exercise its admiralty jurisdiction. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The jurisdictional test handed down by the Supreme Court in Norfolk 
Southern Railway v. Kirby248 should be limited in its application to mixed 
contracts involving multi-modal transportation and/or warehouse-to-
warehouse marine open cargo policies. This is the case as these sorts of 
mixed contracts have objective geographically definable elements to 
them and the significance of maritime elements are apparent. Thus, the 
Kirby test is viable and provides practitioners and commercial men a 
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level of uniformity and predictability that is desirable in maritime 
commerce.   
Moreover, Kirby may even be applied to a certain extent in 
determining whether a dispute over a master service agreement meets the 
jurisdictional requirements for admiralty jurisdiction. This is the case as 
the Fifth Circuit’s “focus-of-the-contract test”249 holistically looks to the 
gist of the contract to determine where a majority of the work was 
contemplated, and based on this finding, the court determines whether 
the contract is or is not a maritime contract justifying the exercise of its 
admiralty jurisdiction. Given the difficulty presented in applying the 
Kirby test to determine whether the court has admiralty jurisdiction over 
a mixed contract such as a master service agreement, a contract that lacks 
the spatial or geographic elements inherent in multi-modal transportation 
contracts and warehouse to warehouse marine cargo insurance policies, it 
appears that the Fifth Circuit approach is the best test for determining 
admiralty jurisdiction because the test focuses on the four corners of the 
contract to determine whether the maritime elements are significant 
enough to justify the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction by looking at 
where a majority of the work to be completed is contemplated. With this 
particular test, parties to the contract may very easily forecast whether a 
dispute will be subject to the court’s admiralty jurisdiction and whether 
or not the parties to the contract will have access to, or must deal with, 
substantive law and procedural rules unique to admiralty.     
Whereas the Fifth Circuit basically occupies the field with regard to 
admiralty jurisdictional analysis with regard to master service 
agreements, the jurisprudence regarding marine insurance umbrella 
policies is all over the map. This is the case because the Kirby 
jurisdictional test is completely inappropriate for more amorphous mixed 
contracts that lack an objective, geographically-definable element or 
some other overt objective element on which to focus, such as marine 
insurance umbrella policies. When it comes to marine insurance umbrella 
policies, it seems as though each circuit has its own jurisdictional test. 
Given this fact, the Courts have done an altogether inadequate job in 
formulating a cohesive and predictable rule or set of rules with which it 
determines what marine insurance contracts, that provide both sea-side 
and shore-side risk coverage, are sufficiently “salty”250 to justify the 
exercise of admiralty jurisdiction for resolving controversies arising from 
such policies. Moreover, given the magnitude of the implications 
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associated with the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction in resolution 
contractual disputes, such as the use of general maritime law or the 
availability of procedural devices, the court has done the maritime 
industry a great disservice in its failure of the aforementioned.   
When looking at the different approaches employed by the different 
circuits, it seems as though the Second Circuit approach makes the most 
sense. As a recap, the Second Circuit employs a two prong test, first 
inquiring into the nature of the dispute as a threshold inquiry, and then, 
only after satisfying itself that the underlying dispute was maritime, the 
court next determines the significance of the maritime elements of the 
policy by examining the actual coverages specified in the policy. This 
approach is arguably the best post-Kirby test employed by any of the 
Circuits because all insurance coverage disputes involve an underlying 
dispute, and the Second Circuit’s threshold inquiry into the nature of the 
dispute ensures maritime issues are properly adjudicated as such. This 
threshold inquiry prevents odd and anomalous results. Moreover, even 
after the underlying dispute has been determined to be maritime, the 
court’s second prong goes even further to ensure that the court accurately 
designates a particular policy as maritime or not by examining the policy 
coverage on the four corners of the document. So, as can be seen, the 
Second Circuit approach provides predictability through common sense 
and consequently also uniformity in the application of federal maritime 
law. This two prong jurisdictional test ensures maritime matters remain 
before a court sitting in admiralty and vice versa.   
In summation, in pursuit of the overarching goal of uniformity in the 
application of admiralty jurisdiction and maritime law, the Kirby test 
should be limited in application to only those mixed contracts that have 
some definite and objective element upon which courts are able to focus, 
such as multi-modal transportation contracts, warehouse to warehouse 
marine cargo insurance policies, or master service agreements.  
Moreover, with regard to master service agreements or blanket contracts, 
if given the opportunity, the other circuits should adopt a test similar to 
that of Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. as propagated by the Fifth Circuit. 
Finally, the multiplicity of jurisdictional tests associated with whether the 
courts may exercise admiralty jurisdiction in order to hear disputes 
arising out of marine insurance umbrella policies covering sea-side and 
shore-side risks is an undesirable result of Kirby, and the Supreme Court 
should resolve the disparate circuit split in favor of a test that is similar to 
that employed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  
 
